



I. THE REFLECTIONS OF THE HUMAN NATURE AND CONDITION

HUMAN NATURE AND THE NATURE ITSELF: NATURAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN NATURE

Béla Mester

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for Humanities, Institute of Philosophy,
Országház utca 30, H-1014 Budapest, Hungary
College of Nyíregyháza, Sóstói út 31/b, H-4400 Nyíregyháza, Hungary
E-mail: mester.bela@btk.mta.hu

This paper offers a historical contribution for understanding of the relationship between nature and culture, based on an analysis of a highly influential text of the European philosophical tradition, *About the Ends of Goods and Evils* of Cicero. Human morality has three different roots on the Ciceronian pages: 1) a human can be an animal – a *part of the live nature* – in the concept of *oikeiōsis*; 2) a human has obligations as a *cosmopolitēs*, a *part of the cosmos*; and 3) social obligations rooted in human rationality, in other words – human being is a *part of the society*. Analyzing these three roots of the Stoic ethics in a Roman interpretation, we can understand their contradictory consequences. By the analysis of the relevant texts it will be demonstrated that the Stoic philosophers and their interpreters were unconscious of the ambiguity of the roots of human morality offered by them. A tension in our anthropological thinking about the human nature as a *natural* or a *social* phenomenon has its roots partly in this ancient ambiguity, hidden and unconscious. The rise of this conceptually confused ambiguity has several consequences in our today thought as well.

Keywords: Cicero, humans as parts of *live* nature, humans as parts of the society, humans as parts of the universe, Stoic ethics.

Introduction

Experiences of the recent researches in the field of history of philosophy of the early modernity has made the scholars of this topic focus on the transformations of the meaning and function of the ancient philosophical concepts, and their hidden work in the later periods of the European thinking. In this case, especially several elements of the Stoic philosophy will be interesting for the possible solutions of the formulation of the fundamental concepts of bioethics, environmental thinking, and our theoretical reflection on the relationship of culture and nature in general. The author of this paper is not a scholar of bioethics, or environmental ethics, and not a scholar of Stoic philosophy. However, the historical part of the following article is based on several

loci of a well-known text of the classical philosophy in Latin, it will be cannot offered a simple application of the Roman period of Stoic philosophy for the modern thinking of the questions of environment, nature, and bioethics. The aim of this paper is to show several structural features of our theoretical reflections on the relationship of humans and the nature, using an antique example. In the followings at first it will be argued for the relevance of the used antique instance in the modern context. Our antique instance will be several paragraphs of *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* III. 16: 63–68 (*The Ends of Goods and Evils*) of Cicero. These paragraphs of *The Ends of Goods and Evils* will be quoted in Harris Rackham's translation (see Cicero 1967: 232–235, for the newest Latin edition with the recent achievements of the philology concerning this text see Cicero 1998). Cicero's work is an eminent, inevitable source of the Stoic philosophy. Later, it will be analyzed the above mentioned text in the context of the conceptual network of humans and the nature in details; the last part of this article will offer several modern parallels.

An additional problem has emerged in here; it is the possible role of the traditions of the moral philosophy outside of Europe in contemporary theoretical reflections of the nature, especially in bioethics. By an often-used reasoning, all the problems of our relationship between humans and the nature are rooted in the European intellectual tradition, and these problems can be solved by the help of other, especially Asian cultural heritage. (The importance of the Asian thought in the contemporary environmental and bioethical discourse became clear recently in the discussions of the *8th Lošinj Days of Bioethics*, 2009, Croatia.) This way of thinking, which meets the trends of several influential movements of environmental thought, rooted in the critical analysis of the European tradition cannot offer a real solution. An intellectual competition of the European and Asian intellectual traditions must be unproductive, and our real task is contradictory: we could find parallels in the problems of the anthropology of these traditions, concerning the concepts of environment, and nature. Probably, we have mainly similar problems in our thoughts concerning the human being. Within this short article it could not be demonstrate the existence of parallel problems in these traditions. Concerning similar problems, we should quote Chinese instances, which are far from the European one historically. In our topic a probably starting point of a possible European–Chinese comparative analysis could be the problem of the evaluation of the human nature. The good, evil, or neutral nature of humankind had a crucial role in the debates between the followers of *Mengzi* and *Xunzi* within the Confucianism, and the history of the same topics amongst the *legalists* (*fajia*), e.g. *Hanfeizi*. Its analysis should be focusing on the role of artificial-cultural and natural elements of the human nature (with the ancient Chinese terminology: *heavenly* and *earthly* elements), and on their consequences in the development of the counter-concepts of *li-yo* and *li-dao* (“rituals” vs. “music”; “social law” vs. “law of nature”). These terms have introduced a similar parallel of the nature, and the culture as the *second nature* of humankind, like is known in Europe. Our task was to show this intellectual parallel, and find its reason to understand ourselves better, instead of trying to correct the believed error of one of them by the supposed tools

of the other one. Recognizing the importance of these intercultural comparisons, we should restrict our inquiries here for a small but fundamental element of the European intellectual history.

Cicero's *De Finibus* has a difficult position in the chain of the European tradition. It is important source of the Stoic philosophy, its important interpreter and in itself an influential work of ethics for many generations with high authority, as well. This high authority is a cause of the (relative) lack of the interpretations of the text, which can show the ambiguity of the foundations of the human morality in it. This ambiguity of the philosophical anthropology of the text is the reason why we can find the roots of the importance of these *loci* of an ancient work in the fields of environmental thought and bioethics. On the pages of *De Finibus* human morality has three different roots: 1) human being is an animal – a *part of the nature* – in the concept of *oikeiōsis* (see Cicero 1967: III. 16); 2) a human has obligations, being a *cosmopolitēs*, a *part of the cosmos* (see Cicero 1967: III. 63–64); and 3) social obligations rooted in human rationality, in other words: a human being is a *part of the society* (see Cicero 1967: III. 67). Analyzing these three roots of the Stoic ethics – using Cicero's linguistically Latin, spiritually Roman, and philosophically eclectic, actually mainly Sceptic interpretation *as a source* – we must find some uncomfortable consequences. In the followings it will be demonstrated that – if Cicero's testimony is trustworthy – Stoic philosophers were unconscious of the ambiguity of the roots of human morality offered by them. There is a hidden tension in our ethical thinking from the point of view of our obligation for the nature, and environment, partly discussed by bioethics, has its roots partly in this ancient, unconscious ambiguity. The quoted pages of Cicero's work are both the witnesses of his ambiguity as testimonies, philological sources, and the causes of the ambiguity of the later generations as readings of high authority.

In the followings at first it will be offered a sketch about the importance and actual relevance of this ancient work by showing the main lines of the European tradition of the moral philosophy, which was rooted partly in this work. It can be exemplified by this work in its structure, as well. The second part of this article is a detailed analysis of the mentioned Ciceronian *loci*, its position and inter-textual relationships within the work, with some remarks on the probable political and cultural aims of its author. Within this part of this paper it will be detailed an interpretation about a meaningful coexistence of the philosophical argumentation and the rhetoric style, using Aristotelian *enthymemes* at the crucial *loci* of the work, the above mentioned paragraphs. (By the Aristotelian concept of the *enthymeme* is an incomplete kind of *syllogism*, used in rhetoric, out of the sphere of the sciences. See Aristotle 1991: 1355b.) In the third part of this paper it will be analyzed the general incommensurability of the three different images of the human being, which are linked in the Ciceronian text only with rhetorical tools, without philosophical argumentation. In the fourth part of this article will be added analogous instances from our contemporary discourse of environment and bioethics, with a hidden incommensurability, similar to the analyzed ones in the Ciceronian text. In the fifth and final part of this article it will be found some kind of solutions for the incommensurability, analyzed both in the Ciceronian

text and in the contemporary discourse. One can try by two ways: supposing a new, exterior common platform for the mentioned images of the human beings, or recognizing the incommensurable plurality of these human images, with all consequences of this plurality.

Why Cicero? Why *De Finibus*?

The relevance of this Ciceronian text is not evident in our contemporary discourse. There are a lot of ancient works, written about similar topics by similar vocabulary. Some of them were written by more inventive authors, than Cicero, whose merits are mainly in the preservation of philosophical opinions, whose primary sources have lost, and a great step in the invention of the Latin vocabulary of Greek philosophy. The relevance lies hidden precisely in a very special role of preservation of the text in the European culture. For understanding this role, we should discuss three details of the question: 1) the role of Stoicism in the history of the European moral philosophy; 2) Cicero's role in the inheritance of the Stoic opinions; and 3) with a close connection with Cicero's role, the dilemma of the contemporary scholars of history of philosophy about the Ciceronian texts as sources.

(1) The Stoic moral philosophy by the public opinion is just a meaningless amount of historical data, an unpleasant obligation for the students of philosophy in the time of their exams of history of philosophy, without any relevance for the debates of contemporary moral philosophy. This oblivion of the Stoic heritage is a modern phenomenon, connected with the Hegelian history of philosophy and philosophy of history, as well. Nowadays, it is an opinion of the past, from the early seventies of the former century we can see a new Renaissance of the Stoic philosophy. It appeared at the first level as a new field of research preferred by the scholars, and later it has become an element of the rethinking and rebuilding our tradition of moral philosophy. It will be referred to only one, haphazard, and very extreme opinion about the role of the Stoic heritage in the rise of the European modernity. A Californian scholar of early Modern Latin wrote in the thirties, that all the Reformation is just a vulgarized part of the neo-Stoic humanist program of the late Renaissance (Meylon 1937). However, it is an unwarrantable thesis in this form nowadays; it well shows the rank of the Stoic heritage in the rise of modernity, and the historical reflections written on it. (Edward F. Meylon's thesis actually is a transformation of a former, pejorative evaluation of the periods of the late Renaissance and the Reformation as *the age of the philologists' terror*.)

(2) The role of Cicero's *The Ends of Goods and Evils* in the inheritance of the Stoic ethics is twofold. Its third book is one of the main secondary sources (*testimonies*) of this ethics for the historians of philosophy, and was a primary source of the ethics itself for educated people during the centuries in the past. (It was an obligatory reading in the most European schools from the times of the early modernity to the beginning of the 20th century. We can say that its patterns have deeply penetrated the discourse of educated people.) Both of these functions are problematic. *The Ends of Goods and*

Evils, as a moral textbook has missed the links with the religion in highly religious centuries. As a source, its elimination was not possible, because of the rarity of the serious sources in this field, but Cicero was always regarded as an unreliable witness. *The Ends of Goods and Evils* was an excellent, but a grey and troubled source at the same time. The evaluation of Cicero in the latest widespread manual of the Hellenistic philosophies is characteristic. Cicero has a separate chapter in this short book amongst the “later developments of the Hellenistic philosophy”, with carefully balanced utterances about his values as a philosopher and his trustworthy as a “witness”, as a secondary source of history of philosophy (see Long 1974).

(3) Scholars of history of philosophy want to filter the water of this grey and troubled source. They have two technologies for it: enabling some elements of the ambiguous Ciceronian image of human beings, or linking it with elements from another source. The aim is in both cases to make a homogeneous moral system based on a homogeneous image of the human beings. The effect of the first technology is a *eudaemonist* Cicero. A characteristic example of the interpretation of almost all the ancient moral philosophy within a *eudaemonist* conceptual framework is Julia Annas’ book (see Annas 1993). Annas discusses the Stoic ethics in her book in three separate *loci* from three separate points of view, in chapters entitled “The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the Universe”, “The Stoics on Other-Concern and Impartiality”, “The Stoics: Natural Law and the Depoliticized Outlook” (see Annas 1993: 159–179, 262–275, 302–311). This interpretation enables Cicero’s important opinions, for instance about the death for the *res publica Romana*, linked with his republican political theory. (Political impact of the text is not the effect of the personality and Roman spirit of the author, only. Cicero’s lifetime was a unique, very short period in the history of the Stoic ethic when the Roman aristocrat followers of this moral philosophy could believe in the moral importance of civic behaviour. *Mundus* was the universe and *Res publica Romana*, as well, for them.) The second way usually combines Cicero’s text with the cosmic *telos* analyzed from *doxography* of *Diogenes Laërtius*. The result is an image of human beings as parts of the cosmos, enabling their biological and social characteristics. Previously, the importance of Cicero was equivalent with his influence to the early modern thought, in our researches. In the questions of the contemporary opinions of historians of philosophy on the Stoic ethics, and the possible interpretations of the crucial Ciceronian text, several lectures of Ákos Brunner on the Stoic ethics were inspired. He has read them within the framework of the Research Seminar of the Institute for Philosophical Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in Budapest, in the academic year of 2008–2009. Later he developed his ideas about this question in a larger form (see Brunner 2010).

We have seen that the main lines of the widespread interpretations have offered a simplified anthropology, restricted the humans to the personal harmony, without context of the environment (*eudaemonism*); regarded them as a part of the universe, or as a part of their political community, only. After this outlined presentation of the context, let us see the text.

Cicero's text and its inter-textual and intercultural context

The Ends of Goods and Evils, as other philosophical works of Cicero, have aims outside of philosophy, too. In the third book we can recognise a direct political, and a cultural intention. His direct political aim was to demonstrate that the idealistic character of the Roman republic, *vir bonus rei publicae* was a naïve follower of the rules of the Greek ethics. His cultural aim was to create a new, Latin vocabulary of the Greek philosophy. This work is paradigmatic in his principles of translation for the all other programs of (philosophical) translation. First of all, the first word of its title, *finis* ("end") is a new term in Latin philosophical vocabulary for the Greek *telos*. Another problem is the question of Cicero's personal philosophical opinions. It is the question of the philosophical opinions of a politician who has used his philosophical background as a tool of his political endeavor. However, his main philosophical background was the academic Scepticism of his age, his eclectic set of philosophical doctrines was interpreted in several variant forms in the historiography of philosophy. Concerning this text is a common opinion that the Stoicism appears in his work as the philosophy of a character of his dialogue, Cato the Younger (*Cato Minor*). (Interpreting this text, we should disregard the real personality of Cato the Younger, and regard his figure as a character of Cicero's fictional framework, similarly to the characters of Plato's works.)

This contextual situation – fictive dialogue, patriotic political and cultural endeavors in the background – effects the alternation of his way of writing. The main part of the third book is a correct explanation of the Stoic moral philosophy, with long paragraphs about the probable Latin translations of the Greek terms, with remarkable ideas of the theory of translation. Some *topoi* – the crucial ones – enable the scholar argumentation, and became similar in their style and content to Cicero's speeches in the court and in the Senate. Cicero in these *loci* uses Aristotle's *enthymemes*, instead of philosophical argumentation. *Enthymemes*, these special rhetoric tools are incomplete syllogisms: parts of the chain of the reasoning are well known by the audience, consequently they are enabling ones. In these *loci*, crucial ones from the point of view of his opinion upon the human nature, Cicero by the strict meaning of the word *abuses* Aristotle's *enthymemes*. His reasoning is not consequent, and the enabled elements are not well known and generally recognized truths. Let us see these fundamental elements of Cicero's work.

Three incommensurable images of the humans, linked by Cicero's rhetoric, only

We can analyze from the text three different and incommensurable images of the human beings or – by other words – three explications of the roots of a theory of *conditio humana*. His first approach is based on a Stoic term, *oikeiōsis*. As a term it is a special forming of the relationship of a living being concerning herself or himself, actually a capacity of every living being (mainly the animals) to feel and obtain themselves. (Its usual English translations are *self-presentation*, or *self-love*. Similarly to the translations in other modern languages, they are not independent from the history of interpretations, since the lifetime of Cicero.) Cicero here uses in Latin several expressions derived from the verb *diligere*:

“He [Cato] began: It is the view of those system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself and to feel affection for its own construction and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action” (see Cicero 1967: III. 16)¹.

We can see that the *conditio humana* is rooted in this approach in the definition of the human being as a biological being, an animal. This part of *The Ends of Goods and Evils* uses a correct explication of the Stoic ethics. We are waiting for a moral system, built on the *diligentia* of the self; probably it was a *eudaemonic* ethics. Cicero offers another, strange image of human beings later:

“It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own” (see Cicero 1967: III. 63–64)².

From it naturally follows that the nature – both of the nature itself and our human nature – instead of *diligentia* of ourselves, teach us to leave in a civil society (in Latin *civitatis*), whose rules come from another human condition, to be a part of the universe, or cosmos (in Latin *mundus*). Human being as natural being, as a part of the society (in Greek *politēs*) and as a part of the cosmos (in Greek *cosmopolitēs*) within two short sentences, without any detailed explication. *Ex quo illo natura consequi* (from which it is a natural consequence), Cicero wrote. It is clear, that in these sentences nothing is the consequence of anything, either naturally or artificially. Human being, as *cosmopolitēs* cannot have any effect on the human being as a *politēs*, and both of these conditions have a very troubled connection with the *diligentia* of the self of a “natural being”. The word *natura* in the Ciceronian text does not refer to the biosphere or to the human nature; it is just a rhetorical element, instead of a philosophical

¹ In Latin: “Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sint eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur adferre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod antequam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. Fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. Ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo” (see Cicero 1998: 232–235).

² In Latin: “Itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus concilia civitates. Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus” (see Cicero 1998: 284–285).

argumentation. (We should pay attention in our interpretations to the difference between the concept of *natura* in the natural philosophy of the lifetime of Cicero and that of *nature* in modern sciences.) It is the voice of Cicero, the lawyer and politician, the speaker of the Senate, and not that of Cicero, the philosopher. By a few paragraphs later he follows his chains of ideas in this merely rhetorical manner:

“But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice” (see Cicero 1967: III. 67)³.

In here the human society appears as an absolutely independent phenomenon from the other living beings of the nature, and without any connection of the whole of the cosmos. (We can remember that a few paragraphs before he derived our sociability from our biological nature and from our status as parts of the cosmos). In this paragraph *ius* and *iniuria* can work only within a concrete human society, in a well-defined state, *pace* animal rights, *pace* human being as *cosmopolitēs*. On the surface, we can realise that Cicero has offered a political interpretation of the Stoic ethics for his Roman fellow-citizens. Seemingly, in this interpretation the hidden possibilities of the ethical evaluation of the *biosphere*, or any environmental, or bioethics must be sacrificed. May be, the incommensurability between the view of humans as animals of the *biosphere*, objects of the *universe*, citizens of their *political communities*, and *micro-cosms* for themselves was insoluble, at least for Cicero.

Conclusions for our time

Could we derive any useful conclusion from these confused paragraphs of the Ciceronian text? Of course, we can say – some widespread, ancient commonplaces. For instance “Do not leave the question of *human condition* to lawyers and politicians, as Cicero was”; or “It is the Roman vulgarization of the Greek philosophy”, or “If we have just such a confused tradition of moral philosophy, preserved by Cicero, instead of that – anything goes”. We should not be satisfied with these banalities. At the bottom of Cicero’s intellectual failure, solved by his rhetoric, only, there is a hidden contradiction of the Stoic philosophy, interpreted by him, which was not his personal opinion. Stoic philosophy – similarly to the other branches of the Greek philosophy – can use the three above-mentioned approaches for the explication of the human affairs. With other, may be, more familiar terms: humans in themselves, as *micro-cosms*, humans in their political communities, *meso-cosms*, and in the unique *macro-cosm* of the universe. By the original system these approaches have made parallel, but isolated and incommensurable descriptions of the same topic, the human being.

³ In Latin: “Et quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. Placlare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria” (see Cicero 1998: 286–287).

In this system of descriptions there is not causal relationship between the elements of the different descriptions. It works similarly to the incommensurable descriptions of the reality in the Eleatic philosophy, especially in the model of *Parmenides*: which is relevant in the world of *doxa*, is a meaningless word in the world of *alētheia*. A philosopher should choose a description of the human beings and their world, whose rules is moral ones, but cannot derive these ethical rules from other descriptions. If she or he will try it, the failure of *Cicero* will find her or him and the solution will be a kind of political rhetoric.

We can see similar dilemmas in our contemporary discourses, too. One of the probable solutions is to set the narratives of the human history into the framework of our relationship with the environment, both by the meaning of *universe*, and *bio-sphere*. It is interesting that a recent overview of the moral opinions of the contemporary human ecology characterizes its topic in a form similar to Cicero's above detailed paragraphs; it speaks about *cosmo-centric*, *bio-centric*, and *anthropocentric* views. (It neglects the human community, see Kiss 2009; for a modern interpretation of our relationship with the dead nature, based partly on Cicero, see Mester 2009). Modern theories will not be interpreted in the next sections; it will be offered instances of the incommensurable images of the human beings in our contemporary environmental discourse.

It will be quoted only three pairs of the statements in here. All of them are anonymous commonplaces; we use them often in conversations, newspapers and sometimes in philosophical writings, especially in the fields of environmental and bioethics. The first part of a pair will refer to the own community of the speaker with a positive; the second part will refer to another human community with a negative connotation. All of them are moral statements, and their moral content was derived from the alternation of the different descriptions of the same world, similarly to the Ciceronian text.

- (1)
 - (a) "We should be more modest, and regard ourselves as a little part of the indifferent cosmos" (it means: we are just things, objects in a sense of this word).
 - (b) "This miserable bureaucracy regards the immigrants just as numbers, things".
- (2)
 - (a) "We should regard ourselves as animals; we should be good sisters and brothers of the apes, at least".
 - (b) "The first crime of the European rulers in Africa was that often thought of local people as apes, or the close relatives of the apes".
- (3)
 - (a) "Environmentally conscious people should regard themselves as the parts of the landscape. Calculate your ecological footprint is more important, than calculate your taxes".
 - (b) "Several governments regarded the indigenous people just as a part of the landscape".

The meaning of the former instances is clear. Every statement explains a moral content using a description of the reality, which has not contained moral elements. The effects are similar to the Ciceronian ones: using philosophical elements,

without enough argumentation, we have made a text of political rhetoric. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

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Probable solutions can be a new established common platform, or a recognized plurality of our thought of anthropology. The former solution, a construction of a common platform is possible, but for many people is boring, and with its anthropocentrism, it is outside of the circle of the popular theories today. It will be offered just a sketch of a theoretical experiment in this topic. If we recognize the practical equivalence of the global thinking and the ancient cosmopolitanism, and we are satisfied with a consequencionalist, anthropocentric moral system, we can probably manage all the environmental and bioethical problems in a way. Following this method, of course, we must give up some romantic slogans and holistic metaphors. Plurality of our thinking, hidden behind them, can be saved only by a political rhetoric. It is not an inferior level of the human culture, using the tradition of the political rhetoric is a republican virtue – see it in the works and life of Cicero, for instance. *Tertium non datur*. We cannot use relevant philosophical arguments in a political speech or rhetorical argumentation in a scholar writing. It is the Aristotelian teaching about the obligatory distinction of the rhetorical and logical reasoning explained in several *loci* of his *The Art of Rhetoric*, and in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics*. May be, it was forgotten, or misinterpreted by Cicero; our task is to reinvent it in a modern form.

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ŽMOGAUS PRIGIMTIS IR NATŪRA KAIP TOKIA: GAMTINIAI IR SOCIALINIAI ŽMOGAUS PRIGIMTIES ASPEKTAI

Béla Mester

Santrauka

Šiame straipsnyje pateiktas istorinis indėlis suprasti gamtos ir kultūros santykių, pagrįstą labai įtakingo europietiškosios filosofinės tradicijos Cicerono teksto *Apie gėrio ir blogio ribas* analize. Žmogiškoji moralė Cicerono puslapiuose turi tris skirtingas šaknis: 1) *oikeiōsis* sampratoje žmogus gali būti gyvūnas – *gyvosios gamtos dalis*; 2) žmogus kaip *cosmopolitēs*, kaip *kosmo dalis*, turi įsipareigojimų; 3) socialiniai įsipareigojimai yra įšaknyti žmogiškajame racionalume, kitais žodžiais tariant, žmogiškoji būtybė yra *visuomenės dalis*. Analizuodami šias tris stoikų etikos šaknis romėniškojoje interpretacijoje, galime suprasti prieštaringas jų pasekmes. Remdamiesi svarbių tekstų analize parodysime, kad stoikų filosofai ir jų interpretatoriai nesuvokė savo pasiūlytosios žmogiškosios moralės šaknų dviprasmiškumo. Mūsų antropologinio mąstymo apie žmogaus prigimtį kaip *gamtinį* ar *socialinį* fenomeną įtampa turi savąsias šaknis iš dalies šiame paslėptame ir nesuvoktame antikiniame dviprasmiškume. Šio konceptualių painaus dviprasmiškumo iškilimas turi tam tikrų pasekmių taip pat ir mūsų nūdienėje mintyje.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: Ciceronas, žmonės kaip *gyvosios gamtos dalys*, žmonės kaip visuomenės dalys, žmonės kaip visatos dalys, stoikų etika.

Received 9 January 2012; accepted 17 February 2012